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DEVELOPING A PHILOSOPHY OF LAWYERING
NATHAN M. CRYSTAL*
Almost all significant ethical decisions that lawyers face in
the practice of law involve discretion. For some of these deci-
sions, no rules or standards guide lawyers. A lawyer's decisions as
to type of practice, location, and organizational form (solo prac-
tice, law firm, corporation, or government office) are examples
of standardless discretionary decisions. Even decisions involving
clients to which rules of professional conduct' apply typically
provide lawyers either with unlimited discretion or with discre-
tion guided only by general standards. Consider, for example, a
lawyer's decision about whether to represent a client,2 or how to
counsel a client (if at all) about nonlegal considerations that
might affect a client's decision.'
Because discretion is so pervasive in the practice of law, law-
yers develop, either thoughtfully or haphazardly, a general
approach for making these decisions. I use the term "philosophy
of lawyering" to refer to the basic principles that a lawyer uses to
deal with the discretionary decisions that the lawyer faces in the
practice of law.4
For a number of years scholars of the legal profession have
debated the merits of various philosophies of lawyering. The
beginning point for this debate has been called "neutral partisan-
ship" or the "dominant view" of the lawyer's role. Under a phi-
losophy of neutral partisanship, lawyers zealously represent their
* Class of 1969 Professor of Professional Responsibility, University of
South Carolina School of Law. My colleague, Lewis Burke, provided valuable
comments on the manuscript. As always, my wife, Nancy McCormick, contrib-
uted in many ways to the article.
1. In this article I use the current version of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. More than 40 states have adopted
the Model Rules, although most states have approved some variations from the
ABA's Model Rules. For a listing of the states that have adopted the Model
Rules, the dates of their adoption, and a summary of variations from the ABA's
Model Rules, see LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 1:3
(1998). New York's Code of Professional Responsibility is based in form on the
ABA's 1969 Code, but actually is a medley of the Code, the Model Rules, and
provisions unique to New York. California has adopted its own Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct that vary considerably from the ABA's Model Rules.
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2 cmt. 1 (1997).
3. See id. Rule 2.1.
4. See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
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clients without moral responsibility for their actions. The only
restraints on neutral partisans are specific legal and professional
obligations.
Critics of neutral partisanship have proposed a number of
alternative philosophies. In broad terms, these alternative phi-
losophies draw their inspiration from moral values or from social
or professional norms.5 William Simon's The Practice ofJustice6 is
the most recent comprehensive presentation of a philosophy of
lawyering. Despite this extensive debate, no philosophy of lawy-
ering has been able to gain consensus within the profession, and
none appears likely to do so.
This state of affairs has created an individual and profes-
sional conundrum. The discretionary nature of practice
demands that lawyers adopt a philosophy of lawyering. Yet, the
lack of professional consensus means that lawyers receive little
guidance as to how to go about developing such a philosophy.
Part I of this paper describes the wide range of discretionary
decisions that lawyers face. Part II presents the concept of a phi-
losophy of lawyering and summarizes the major scholarly efforts
to present and defend different philosophies of lawyering. Part
III offers a mechanism by which the organized bar can provide
institutional support for lawyers to develop philosophies of lawy-
ering without at the same time mandating a choice among differ-
ent philosophies. The approach has four central elements: (1)
bar application statement of a philosophy of lawyering; (2)
annual certification and revision of a lawyer's philosophy of lawy-
ering; (3) required notification to clients of a lawyer's philosophy
of lawyering; (4) disciplinary actions against lawyers for flagrant
violation of the terms of their philosophy of lawyering. I con-
clude with responses to criticisms that I expect to be leveled
against my proposal.
I. DISCRETION IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Almost all significant ethical decisions that lawyers face
related to the practice of law involve discretion. I use the term
"discretion" loosely to refer to a relative degree of freedom to
decide how to act, as opposed to decisions based on specific
rules.7 The rules of ethics requiring written contingent fee
5. See infra notes 71-94 and accompanying text.
6. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS'
ETHICS (1998).
7. The modem critique of legal formalism has called into question the
proposition that rules can ever determine results. See David B. Wilkins, Legal
Realism for Lauyers, 104 HARv. L. REv. 468 (1990). The validity of this critique is
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agreements8 or prohibiting commingling of funds are two exam-
ples of specific rules that are designed to eliminate discretion. 9
Within the general category of discretion, distinctions can be
drawn based on the degree of discretion that lawyers possess.
Sometimes lawyers have very broad discretion that is unrestricted
by a standard. Lawyers' choice of area of practice and their
amount of pro bono work are examples. In other situations, law-
yers have weaker discretion, restricted by or "grounded" in a gen-
eral standard.1 ° The conflict of interest rules provide an
example."
The first decision that a lawyer faces in connection with a
legal matter is whether to represent the potential client. Rules of
professional conduct provide lawyers broad, largely unrestricted
discretion in the decision to undertake representation. The
comment to Model Rule 6.2 provides: "A lawyer ordinarily is not
obliged to accept a client whose character or cause the lawyer
regards as repugnant."1 2 The rule and its comments recognize
two narrow qualifications to this broad grant of discretion. The
rule states: "A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a
tribunal to represent a person except for good cause."' 3 The
comment provides that "[a]ll lawyers have a responsibility to
assist in providing pro bono publico service."14 Rule 6.1, which
deals with pro bono work, however, is itself aspirational and dis-
cretionary rather than mandatory.
15
While a lawyer's decision about who to represent is largely
unrestricted by rules, the institutional context in which lawyers
practice may limit or eliminate their discretion to accept or reject
cases. For example, associates in law firms are generally required
to handle matters assigned by their employers. A firm may toler-
ate occasional complaints or refusals to accept cases, but associ-
ates who persist in such conduct will be told to seek employment
elsewhere.
not essential, however, to my argument. If the critique is correct in whole or in
part, then lawyers have an even broader area of discretion than described in
this article. If the critique is false, lawyers nonetheless have a substantial degree
of discretion, particularly with regard to important ethical decisions.
8. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(c) (1997).
9. See id. Rule 1.15(a).
10. See Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decision-
making, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19 (1997).
11. See infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
12. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2 cmt. 1 (1997).
13. Id. Rule 6.2.
14. Id. Rule 6.2 cmt. 1.
15. See id. Rule 6.1.
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Unrestricted discretion like that exercised by lawyers in
choosing clients may be challenged and, over time, may become
subject to restrictions. Stropnicky v. Nathanson6 is an example of
such a development. In Stropnicky, a hearing commissioner with
the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination sanc-
tioned a female domestic relations lawyer under the state's pub-
lic accommodations law for declining to represent a male party
in divorce proceedings.
Assuming that a lawyer is willing to represent a client, the
lawyer must decide whether the representation involves a conflict
of interest. The two principal conflicts of interest rules are
Model Rules 1.7 and 1.9. Rule 1.7 deals with conflicts of interest
among current clients or when the lawyer has a personal conflict-
ing interest, while Rule 1.9 regulates representation against for-
mer clients. Many lawyers may decide not to undertake
representation against a current or former client pursuant to
their general discretionary authority to refuse to handle a matter.
For some lawyers, this decision may be a matter of principle; they
believe that it is unseemly and disloyal to undertake representa-
tion against a current or former client. Other lawyers may base
such a refusal on self-protection; they realize that if they repre-
sent a party against a current or former client, they increase the
risk that they will be subject to a disqualification motion, a disci-
plinary charge, or a malpractice suit.
Even if a lawyer decides that she is not opposed to undertak-
ing representation against a current or former client, either as a
matter of principle or prudence, the lawyer must still analyze the
application of the conflict of interest rules. A lawyer may under-
take representation against a current client despite the existence
of an actual or potential conflict if "the lawyer reasonably
believes the representation will not adversely affect the relation-
ship with the other client" and each client consents after consul-
tation. 17 However, "when a disinterested lawyer would conclude
that the client should not agree to the representation under the
circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such
agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's
consent.""8 "Consultation," as defined by the Model Rules,
"denotes communication of information reasonably sufficient to
16. No. 91-BPA-0061 (Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination Feb. 25,
1997). See Steve Berenson, Politics and Plurality in a Lawyer's Choice of Clients: The
Case of Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1998); Symposium, A
Duty to Represent? Critical Reflections on Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 20 W. NEW ENG.
L. REv. 5 (1998).
17. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1997).
18. Id. Rule 1.7 cmt. 5.
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permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in
question."' 9  Lawyers must exercise discretion in deciding
whether a "disinterested lawyer" would refuse to handle the mat-
ter and in determining what information is reasonably sufficient
to permit the client to make an informed decision about con-
senting to the representation.
A lawyer may not undertake representation against a former
client "in the same or a substantially related matter in which that
person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the
former client unless the former client consents after consulta-
tion. '  The generality of this standard requires the exercise of
professional discretion. In particular, courts have adopted widely
differing definitions of the "substantial relationship" test.2
During the course of representation, lawyers must counsel
their clients about various issues. The Model Rules provide law-
yers a wide range of discretion about the scope of advice they
give: "In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but
to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and
political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation."2
The comments elaborate on the scope of lawyers' discretion.
Lawyers should not be deterred from giving advice because it
may be "unpalatable" to clients.2" Lawyers may refer to moral
and ethical considerations because purely technical advice is
often inadequate.24 Lawyers may often need to raise issues on
their own, even when clients have not asked for advice. 25 Even
when a matter involves issues within the expertise of other pro-
fessionals, a lawyer may need to help the client choose among
conflicting opinions.
26
In litigation, decisions must be made about the objectives of
representation and the means used to achieve those objectives.
Decisions about objectives of representation (for example,
whether to plead guilty in a criminal case or to accept an offer of
settlement in a civil case) are for the client to make after consul-
19. Id. Terminology.
20. Id. Rule 1.9(a).
21. See Charles W. Wolfram, Former-Client Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETH-
ics 677 (1997).
22. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1997). For an
example of the wide range of discretion available to lawyers in compliance
counseling, see Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lauyers, 68 B.U. L. REv.
1, 26-30 (1988).
23. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 cmt. 1 (1997).
24. See id. cmt. 2.
25. See id. cmts. 3, 5.
26. See id. cmt. 4.
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tation with the lawyer.27 Decisions about tactical matters, the
means to be used to achieve the client's objectives, are within the
province of the lawyer after consultation with the client when fea-
sible.2" Thus lawyers have discretion about matters such as the
formulation of legal theories, the nature and scope of discovery,
witnesses and documents to introduce at trial, and objections to
admissibility of evidence.29
The rules dealing with false evidence illustrate the scope of
lawyer discretion. A lawyer shall not offer evidence- the, lawyer
"knows" is false.30 However, a lawyer may refuse to offer evidence
that the lawyer "reasonably believes is false.""1 Because lawyers
will rarely know when evidence is false, 32 the discretionary rule
will apply in almost all cases.
In some cases, particularly ones in which there is substantial
public interest, lawyers may face decisions about whether to
engage in trial publicity on behalf of their Clients. Model Rule
3.6 regulates extrajudicial statements by lawyers, but the rule
imposes only modest restrictions on such communications. Law-
yers are prohibited from making extrajudicial statements only
when those statements have "a substantial likelihood of materi-
ally prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter."3 In
addition, lawyers have a right to reply to prejudicial pretrial pub-
licity to the extent necessary to mitigate such publicity.34 Thus
the wisdom, timing, and content of extrajudicial statements are
largely within lawyers' discretion.35
A lawyer's discretion with regard to tactical matters is, of
course, restricted, not unbounded. A client can discharge a law-
yer if the client does not approve of the way the lawyer is han-
27. See id Rule 1.2(a).
28. See id.
29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERs § 32(3)
cmt. e (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
30. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a) (4) (1997).
31. Id. Rule 3.3(c).
32. Most courts and the Restatement have taken the view that the test for
knowledge is whether the lawyer has a "firm factual basis" for believing the evi-
dence is false. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 857 F.2d 436, 445 (8th Cir. 1988);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAwYERS § 180 cmt. c (Tentative
Draft No. 8, 1997). Some courts have suggested an even higher standard of
beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Shockley v. State, 565 A.2d 1373, 1379
(Del. 1989).
33. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6(a) (1997).
34. See id. Rule 3.6(c).
35. See Kevin Cole & Fred C. Zacharias, The Agony of Victory and the Ethics of
Lawyer Speech, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1627 (1996) (discussing factors that lawyers
should consider in their discretionary decisions to engage in extrajudicial
statements).
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dling the case. 6 Lawyers who fail to exercise their discretion
reasonably may also be subject to malpractice liability.
3 7
The rules of professional conduct assume that lawyers nor-
mally deal with clients who are competent to make decisions
when receiving advice from their lawyers. Many lawyers, how-
ever, regularly represent clients who have marginal capacity.
Such incapacity can result from substance abuse, mental retarda-
tion, or youth. The Model Rules give lawyers a broad degree of
discretion' for dealing with such clients, providing that lawyers
should attempt to maintain a normal client-attorney relationship
as far as reasonably possible.3" If the lawyer concludes that a cli-
ent "cannot adequately act in the client's own interest," the law-
yer may take such steps as the lawyer considers appropriate to
protect the. client's interest.39 The comments note: "Evaluation
of these considerations is a matter of professional judgment on
the lawyer's part."4
One of the most difficult decisions a lawyer can face in prac-
tice deals with revelation of confidential information to prevent a
client from committing a wrongful act or to rectify the conse-
quences of a client's wrong. Unlike the rules discussed previ-
ously, Model Rule 1.6 provides lawyers with a quite restricted
area of discretion to reveal confidential information. Rule 1.6
allows a lawyer to reveal confidential information "to prevent the
client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm."4"
Under the rule, a lawyer does not have discretion to reveal confi-
dential information to prevent a horrible injustice, such as pun-
ishment of an innocent person, because the revelation would not
prevent the client from committing a criminal act.42 The rule
also does not allow a lawyer to reveal confidential information
about a client's past criminal conduct even if the client's crimes
have ongoing harmful ramifications.43 Rule 1.6 would, however,
36. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a) (3) (1997).
37. See generally RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRAC-
TICE (4th ed. 1996).
38. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14(a) (1997).
39. Id. Rule 1.14(b).
40. Id. Rule 1.14 cmt. 3.
41. Id. Rule 1.6(b)(1).
42. See id. The Leo Frank case is the most famous example of such a situa-
tion. For a discussion of the Frank case, see NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ch. 1 (1998). See also Symposium,
Executing the Wrong Person: The Professionals' Ethical Dilemmas, 29 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 1543 (1996).
43. Lawyers Frank Armani and Francis Beige faced such a situation in the
famous "buried bodies" case. For a discussion of the case, see RICHARD ZrrIN
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allow a lawyer to reveal confidential information if the client
threatened to kill someone. The comments to Rule 1.6 empha-
size the discretionary aspects of the lawyer's decision to reveal
confidential information. The comments point out that it is
often difficult for the lawyer to "know" whether the client intends
to carry out a threat.44 Because the exercise of discretion
requires lawyers to weigh a number of factors, the lawyer's deci-
sion to reveal or not to reveal confidential information should
not be reexamined.45
Many states do not follow Model Rule 1.6 and instead pro-
vide lawyers with a greater degree of discretion to reveal confi-
dential information. More than half of the states have returned
to the formulation of the confidentiality rule found in the Code
of Professional Responsibility, giving lawyers discretion to reveal
confidential information to prevent clients from committing
crimes. 46 In addition, the American Law Institute has adopted a
rule that would allow a lawyer to reveal confidential information
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary "to prevent
reasonably certain death or serious bodily harm to a person,"
without regard to whether the client was committing a criminal
act.
4 7
The rules dealing with withdrawal from representation also
provide lawyers with a substantial amount of discretionary
authority. Lawyers have the power to withdraw "if withdrawal can
be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests
of the client."48 In addition, lawyers may permissibly withdraw in
six situations, the broadest of which occurs when "a client insists
upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant
or imprudent. '49 The rules also authorize lawyers to withdraw
when "the representation . . . has been rendered unreasonably
difficult by the client."5 A lawyer's power to withdraw is, of
& CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER ch. 1
(1999).
44. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 12 (1997).
45. See id. Rule 1.6 cmt. 13; id. Scope para. 8 ("lawyer's exercise of discre-
tion not to disclose information under Rule 1.6 should not be subject to
reexamination").
46. See SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Appendix
A to Model Rules on Ethical Rules on Client Confidences (Thomas D. Morgan
& Ronald D. Rotunda eds., 1999).
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 117A (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 2, 1998).
48. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b) (1997). For a
criticism of this provision, see CRYSTAL, supra note 42, at 82-83.
49. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b) (3) (1997).
50. Id. Rule 1.16(b) (5).
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course, restricted in those cases when the matter is pending
before a tribunal where court approval is required.
The degree to which lawyers become involved in pro bono
service" and other professional activities is largely a matter of
unrestricted discretion. The Model Rules do not speak to the
lawyer's obligation regarding professional self-regulation except
in a very limited way: "A lawyer having knowledge that another
lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's hon-
esty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall
inform the appropriate professional authority. '52 A similar rule
applies to reporting misconduct of judges.5 ' As the comments
recognize, application of the obligation to report requires the
exercise of discretion:
If a lawyer were obliged to report every violation of the
Rules, the failure to report any violation would itself be a
professional offense. Such a requirement existed in many
jurisdictions but proved to be unenforceable. This Rule
limits the reporting obligation to those offenses that a self-
regulating profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent.
A measure of judgment is, therefore, required in comply-
ing with the provisions of this Rule. The term "substantial"
refers to the seriousness of the possible offense and not the
quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware.54
The previous discussion does not by any means exhaust the
areas of professional life in which lawyers have discretion. For
example, lawyers' commercial activity is largely a matter of pro-
fessional discretion. The rules dealing with legal fees provide
that lawyers should charge "reasonable" fees,55 but aside from
this general standard and a few isolated rules dealing with contin-
gent fee methods, the amounts of fees are a matter of profes-
sional discretion. Similarly, the rules dealing with advertising
prohibit lawyers from engaging in false or misleading advertis-
ing,5 6 but the decision of whether to advertise and the methods
for communicating information about professional services are
discretionary. The basic point is clear: decisions of professional
responsibility, particularly the important ones, are overwhelm-
ingly discretionary.
51. See id. Rule 6.1.
52. Id. Rule 8.3(a).
53. See id. Rule 8.3(b).
54. Id. Rule 8.3 cmt. 3.
55. Id. Rule 1.5(a).
56. See id. Rule 7.1.
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II. THE CONCEPT OF A PHILOSOPHY OF LAW'ERING
Recall that the phrase "philosophy of lawyering" refers to
the basic principles that a lawyer uses to deal with discretionary
decisions. A philosophy of lawyering operates at three interre-
lated levels: the personal, the practice, and the institutional.
When I refer to the personal level of a philosophy of lawyering, I
mean the relationship between the lawyer's professional career
and the lawyer's private life.
For most lawyers, the fundamental issue at the personal level
is seeking some accommodation between competing goals of
professional advancement and family life. In addressing this
issue lawyers need to consider questions like the following:
What type of practice do I see myself going into: civil
litigation, corporate law, prosecution or defense of crimi-
nal cases, legal services? Large or small organization?
What area of the country or the world?
What types of ethical problems am I likely to encoun-
ter in this type of practice?
What level of income do I aspire to have? Will the
practice that I plan to undertake meet my economic
aspirations?
What kind of personal life do I wish to have? Will the
demands of the type of practice that I envision allow me to
have the kind of personal life I desire?
Do I have enough information about the type of prac-
tice that I envision to answer these questions? If not, how
am I going to get this information? If the type of practice
that I contemplate will not allow me to meet either my
income or personal desires, are there alternatives that I
should consider?
In the practice of law, rules of professional conduct some-
times provide clear answers to questions of how a lawyer should
act. For example, a lawyer may not ethically prepare a will for a
client when the lawyer will receive a substantial bequest, unless
the lawyer is related to the client.57 Contingent fee agreements
with clients must be in writing.58 As Part I shows, however, the
demanding questions of professional responsibility do not admit
of such black-or-white answers. Lawyers often must make diffi-
cult judgments governed only by general standards in a context
that involves the lawyer personally: Should I agree to handle this
multimillion dollar case against a company that my firm did
57. See id. Rule 1.8(c).
58. See id. Rule 1.5(c).
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some work for three years ago? Should I accept this malpractice
case against one of my classmates when I think the case has
merit, when the client has not been able to find another lawyer
to take the case, and when the statute of limitations is about to
run? How should I respond to a request for production of docu-
ments worded in such a way that I could, arguably, deny the exist-
ence of what was requested-even though I know what the other
side wants? Resolving hard questions not only requires close
attention to the rules of ethics and other standards of profes-
sional behavior, but also means that lawyers must develop an
approach to handling such issues. This approach is the practice
component of a philosophy of lawyering.
While the personal level of a philosophy of lawyering refers
to the relationship between a lawyer's private life and the lawyer's
professional role, the institutional level refers to the relationship
between the lawyer's private and professional life and the
broader institutional issues facing the profession as a whole.59
The profession has faced and continues to face a number of sig-
nificant and controversial issues, such as the effectiveness of the
disciplinary process,6" the adequacy of current mechanisms for
delivery of legal services,6 1 the actual or perceived decline in pro-
fessionalism,62  and relationships with other professionals
through multidisciplinary practice.6" The institutional level of a
lawyer's philosophy of lawyering will identify and explain the law-
yer's commitment to resolution of these broader issues.
How should lawyers develop a philosophy of lawyering? One
way is to search for role models. Biographies of many prominent
lawyers6 4 or fictional portrayals of attorneys65 can provide gui-
dance for lawyers in their quest for a philosophy of lawyering.
59. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L.
REv. 589 (1985).
60. See ABA Comm'n on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Lawyer
Regulation for a New Century (1992).
61. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Nonlawyers, 4
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209 (1990).
62. See, e.g., Conference of Chief Justices, A National Action Plan on Lawyer
Conduct and Professionalism (1998) [hereinafter National Action Plan] (discussing
institutional and individual roles in promoting lawyer professionalism).
63. See ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of
Delegates (visited Dec. 1, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinalreport.
html>.
64. See, e.g., JOHNNIE L. COCHRAN, JR. & TIM RUrITEN, JOURNEY TO JUSTICE
(1996); VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: WOMEN LAWYERS IN MODERN
AMERICAN HIsTORY (1998); ARTHUR L. LIMAN & PETER ISRAEL, LAWYER: A LIFE OF
COUNSEL AND CONTROVERSY (1998); PHILPPA STRUM, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PRO-
GRESSIVIsM (1993); EVAN THOMAS, THE MAN TO SEE: EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMS
(1991); KEVIN TIERNEY, DARROW: A BIOGRAPHY (1979).
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In addition to the examples of other lawyers, a substantial
body of literature has developed, justified, and critiqued various
philosophies of lawyering. In broad terms, philosophies of lawy-
ering can be divided into three categories. The traditional view
of the lawyer's role can be characterized as a client-centered philoso-
phy. Professor Murray Schwartz set forth two principles that he
argued accurately described the essence of client-centered lawy-
ering." First, lawyers act as zealous partisans on behalf of their
clients, doing everything possible to enable their clients to pre-
vail in litigation or to obtain their clients' objectives in nonlitiga-
tion matters, except to the extent that rules of professional
conduct or legal principles clearly prohibit the lawyer's conduct.
Under a client-centered philosophy, if doubt exists about the
propriety of an action, the lawyer is justified in proceeding. Only
clear violations of law or rules of ethics, like bribing witnesses,
are prohibited. Schwartz referred to this idea as the Principle of
Professionalism. Second, when acting in this professional role,
lawyers are neither legally nor morally accountable for their
actions. Schwartz called this concept the Principle of Nonac-
countability.67 Similarly, Professor William Simon has referred to
two principles of conduct-neutrality and partisanship-as form-
ing the core of what he called the "Ideology of Advocacy."6 Fol-
lowing Simon, many writers now use the term "Neutral
Partisanship" to refer to the standard conception of the lawyer's
role. A more colloquial way of putting these ideas is that lawyers
are "hired guns."
One can criticize a client-centered philosophy of lawyering
for its incompleteness. This approach to lawyering provides
attorneys with guidance on most difficult questions of profes-
sional ethics (what I have called the practice level): If I have dis-
cretion to act, do what is in my client's interest. A client-centered
philosophy could also be applied at the personal and institu-
tional levels, but even lawyers who are most committed to this
philosophy in their practices would almost certainly find it intol-
erable when applied to their personal and institutional lives.
65. See, e.g., HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960). For a critical
view of Atticus Finch, see Monroe H. Freedman, Atticus Finch-Right and Wrong,
45 ALA. L. REv. 473 (1994).
66. See Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers,
66 CAL. L. REV. 669 (1978); Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate,
1983 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543.
67. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 7 (1988) (relying on
Schwartz's principles as the basis for a normative evaluation of the adversary
system).
68. William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and Profes-
sional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29, 34-39.
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While quite a few lawyers in fact subordinate their family lives to
the practice of law, I doubt many of them would be willing to
adopt this approach as a matter of principle. Similarly, I doubt
many lawyers would agree that when serving on bar committees
or other law reform organizations they should abandon ideas of
the public interest or common good in favor of seeking "reform"
which favors their clients' interests. Of course, situations may
arise in which the interests of a lawyer's clients conflict with law
reform proposals. Such a conflict may force the lawyer to recuse
himself from the reform activity.6 9 But nonparticipation because
of a conflict with client interests is very different from continued
participation to promote client interests.7"
The most fundamental attack on the concept of a client-cen-
tered philosophy of lawyering is that it is morally unsound.7"
This philosophy requires lawyers in the course of representation
of clients to engage in conduct that violates conventional
morality:
[The critics] claim that lawyers routinely do things for cli-
ents that harm third parties and would therefore be
immoral, even in the lawyers' eyes, if done for themselves
or for non-clients. Such actions constitute "role-differenti-
ated behavior" in the sense that the actors, if asked to jus-
tify themselves, would claim that their role as a lawyer
required them to "put to one side [moral] considerations
... that would otherwise be relevant if not decisive." A
lawyer's role-differentiated behavior could involve helping
a client pursue a morally objectionable aim, or using a
hurtful or unfair tactic to give a client an advantage. Spe-
cific examples might include invoking the statute of frauds
to help a client avoid paying a debt he really owes, attack-
ing an honest person's veracity in order to discredit him as
69. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.4 cmt. (1997).
70. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 595 (1995) (arguing that private legislatures like
the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws are subject to interest group politics often through the par-
ticipation of lawyers).
71. Another thread of the critique of client-centered lawyering is that this
philosophy ignores the importance of truthful resolution of legal disputes. In
1975, Judge Marvin Frankel noted that a litigator "is not primarily crusading
after truth, but seeking to win." Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An
Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1039 (1975). See also MARvIN E. FRANKEL,
PARTISAN JusTICE (1980). Judge Frankel went on to propose a rule of profes-
sional ethics designed to force lawyers to give greater weight to the truth. See
Frankel, supra, at 1057-58. For a critique of Judge Frankel's views, see MONROE
H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 26-33 (1990).
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a witness, taking advantage of an opponent's misunder-
standing of the applicable law in settlement negotiations,
or suggesting that a corporate client lay off some of its
workers until the Justice Department comes to see the mer-
its of the company's merger proposal. Off duty, lawyers
would presumably not think it appropriate to avoid repay-
ing a debt, impugn a truthful person's honesty, take advan-
tage of another's mistake, or exploit workers. On duty, the
philosophers say, lawyers routinely do such things for their
clients.
72
These criticisms of the philosophy of neutral partisanship
have generated a number' of responses. One type of response is
empirical: neutral partisanship does not accurately describe the
behavior of lawyers.73 Some empirical studies (although limited
in number and scope) of the behavior of criminal defense law-
yers, lawyers in small communities, lawyers in nonlitigation activi-
ties, and lawyers in large law firms cast doubt on the claim that
neutral partisanship accurately describes the behavior of most
lawyers. Indeed, some of these studies suggest that the problem
with the way lawyers conceive of their role is the opposite of neu-
tral partisanship; lawyers are not sufficiently zealous in represent-
ing their clients because they are concerned about protecting
their reputations, preserving relationships with other lawyers,
judges, or officials, or advancing their own interests.7 4
In addition, some scholars argue that neutral partisanship
can be defended on moral grounds. Even lawyers who appear to
be acting as neutral partisans may find such representation mor-
ally justified because the representation advances some higher
principle-freedom of speech or due process of law, for exam-
ple. An ACLU lawyer who defends the Nazi Party's right to
march in a Jewish neighborhood may do so, not because he is
72. Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics,
1984 Wis. L. REV. 1529, 1532-33. In PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAwYERs BEHAVE AS
THEY Do (1998), Professor Haskell offers 23 examples of morally questionable
behavior that are either clearly or arguably permissible for lawyers. The moral
critique of the role of neutral partisanship is developed in ALAN H. GOLDMAN,
THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 90-155 (1980); LUBAN, supra
note 67; GeraldJ. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 63 (1980); Simon, supra note 68; Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Profes-
sionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975).
73. See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 116, 120-129 (1990) (reviewing LUBAN, supra note 67);
Schneyer, supra note 72.
74. See Schneyer, supra note 72, at 1544-50. For a response to the criti-
cism that neutral partisanship does not accurately describe lawyer behavior, see
LUBAN, supra note 67, at 393-403.
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acting as a neutral partisan, but because he considers protecting
the principle of free speech more important than restricting dis-
semination of their immoral views.7 5 Further, many lawyers find
moral value to the preservation of the attorney-client relation-
ship. Professor Stephen Pepper has presented the most compre-
hensive defense of neutral partisanship on the basis of moral
principle. He argues that the lawyer's amoral role is morallyjus-
tified because the role assists clients in exercising autonomy. For
lawyers to assert moral control over their clients would under-
mine that autonomy.
76
The critics of neutral partisanship have offered an alterna-
tive philosophy, which can be referred to as a philosophy of moral-
ity.77 Under this philosophy lawyers are morally accountable for
the actions that they take on behalf of their clients and must be
prepared to defend the morality of what they do.
Adoption of a philosophy of morality has a number of practi-
cal lawyering consequences. Lawyers would decline representa-
tion in more cases than they would under a client-centered
philosophy, those cases in which the lawyer concluded that the
representation was morally indefensible. Lawyers would with-
draw from representation more frequently, for example, in cases
in which clients demanded that lawyers pursue goals or tactics
that the lawyer found to be morally unsound. Lawyers would
take a broader view of their obligations as counselors, at a mini-
mum raising moral issues with their clients and often trying to
convince their clients to take what the lawyer considered to be
75. See Ellmann, supra note 73, at 126; Schneyer, supra note 72, at 1562-
64.
76. See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lauyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a
Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613. For criticisms of
this view and Professor Pepper's response, see Symposium on the Lawyer's
Amoral Ethical Role, 1986 Am. B. FOUND. RES.J, 613. See also Charles Fried, The
Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Layer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J.
1060 (1976).
77. Probably the most comprehensive development of a philosophy of
morality can be found in LUBAN, supra note 67. A number of other scholars
have also offered their views on how moral values can be incorporated into the
lawyer's role. See generally THoMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAW-
vERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994). See also GoLmAN, supra note
72, at 138 (lawyers should only aid clients in exercising their moral rights);
Leslie Griffin, The Lawyer's Dirty Hands, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 219 (1995) (calls
for lawyers' conduct to be judged by common morality). Professor Serena Stier
contends that the standard conception of the lawyer's role, in which profes-
sional conduct and morality are separate spheres, is fundamentally flawed. See
Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 551 (1991). She
argues for an "integrity thesis" in which professional conduct and morality are
integrated rather than distinct. See id.
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the morally correct action. In situations in which lawyers had
professional discretion about how to act, or in which the rules
were unclear, a lawyer acting under a philosophy of morality
would take the action that the lawyer believed to be indicated by
principles of morality, even if this action was not necessarily in
the client's interest.7"
One difficulty with a philosophy of morality is that the
sources of moral values are extensive and varied. Professor
Luban bases his theory of morality on principles of moral philos-
ophy. Other lawyers may turn to religion for the source 'of their
values.7 Some scholars, drawing on the work of Carol Gilligan,
have attempted to develop a philosophy of lawyering based on an
ethic of care.8°
Other critics of client-centered lawyering have sought to
develop approaches based on social values or norms rather than
principles of morality. The major advantage of a philosophy of
social value is that it is grounded in norms expressed in social
institutions. Such values are likely to be seen as more objective
and justified than moral values, which are often viewed as indi-
vidual, subjective, and controversial. It should be noted that the
philosophies of morality and social value are not inconsistent
because social values often embody moral principles. For exam-
ple, Professor Robert Gordon advocates a vision of law as a public
profession and describes ways in which lawyers could implement
that ideal in the conditions of modern practice."1 Professor
Bradley Wendel strives to develop a set of public values of lawyer-
ing derived from the "social function of lawyers and from the
traditions and practices of the legal profession."' 2 Professor
Timothy Terrell and Mr. James Wildman examine the factors
that have caused a crisis of professionalism for lawyers.8" They
argue that the true foundation of professionalism must be found
in a commitment to the rule of law.84 Terrell and Wildman iden-
tify six values that they believe lie at the core of professionalism:
78. See LuBAN, supra note 67, at 160, 173-74.
79. See Symposium, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: An Inter-
faith Conference, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1075 (1998).
80. See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81
GEO. L.J. 2665 (1993); Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic
of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 HAsTINcs L.J. 1175 (1992).
81. See Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD.
L. REv. 255 (1990).
82. W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 7 (1999).
83. See Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking "Professional-
ism", 41 EMORY LJ. 403 (1992).
84. See id. at 423.
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1. An Ethic of Excellence;
2. An Ethic of Integrity: A Responsibility to Say "No";
3. A Respect for the System and Rule of Law: A Responsi-
bility to Say "Why";
4. A Respect for Other Lawyers and Their Work;
5. A Commitment to Accountability;
6. A Responsibility for Adequate Distribution of Legal
Services. 85
The most comprehensive statement of a philosophy of lawy-
ering based on social values is found in the work of Professor
William Simon.8 6 He argues that the basic principle that should
govern lawyer conduct is the following: "[T]he lawyer should
take such actions as, considering the relevant circumstances of
the particular case, seem likely to promote justice."8 7 Simon uses
the term "Justice" not in some abstract or philosophical sense,
but rather as equivalent with "legal merit" of the case.8 8 In decid-
ing the legal merit of the case, the lawyer must exercise contex-
tual or discretionary decisionmaking.8 9 Simon identifies two
dimensions to this approach. First, in deciding to represent a
client, a lawyer should assess the "relative merit" of the client's
claims and goals in relation to other clients that the lawyer might
serve. Simon recognizes that financial considerations play a sig-
nificant role in lawyers' decisions to represent clients, but he calls
on lawyers to take into account relative merit in addition to
financial considerations.9 ° Second, in the course of representa-
tion, Simon calls on lawyers to assess the "internal merit" of their
clients' claims. Simon rejects the view that lawyers should assume
complete responsibility for determining the outcome of cases:
"Responsibility to justice is not incompatible with deference to
the general pronouncements or enactments of authoritative
institutions such as legislatures and courts. On the contrary, jus-
tice often, perhaps usually, requires such deference."'" However,
when procedural defects exist, the lawyer's obligation to do jus-
tice requires the lawyer to assume responsibility for promoting
the substantively just outcome: "[T] he more reliable the relevant
procedures and institutions, the less direct responsibility the law-
85. See id. at 424-31.
86. Simon has developed his ideas in William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion
in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083 (1988); Simon, supra note 68. Simon
expands and deepens these views in SIMON, supra note 6.
87. SIMON, supra note 6, at 9.
88. Id. at 10.
89. See id. ch. 6.
90. See Simon, supra note 86, at 1092-93.
91. SIMON, supra note 6, at 138. See also Simon, supra note 86, at 1096-97.
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yer need assume for the substantive justice of the resolution; the
less reliable the procedures and institutions, the more direct
responsibility she needs to assume for substantive justice. "92
Simon's theory has, of course, been subjected to extensive criti-
cism, even among scholars who, like Simon, are critics of neutral
partisanship.93
Numerous combinations and variations of the general
approaches outlined above could be developed. For example,
one could imagine a philosophy of lawyering that seeks to com-
bine elements of neutral partisanship and social responsibility.
Under such a philosophy, a lawyer would act in accordance with
the tenets of neutral partisanship when representing clients, but
would become a social and moral activist in her institutional role.
Similarly, some lawyers could adopt the view that morality may be
taken into account in the practice of law, but they could differ on
the extent to which moral considerations become relevant.
94
III. THE PROBLEM AND A PROPOSAL
A. The Problem
My survey of the scope of lawyer discretion under the Model
Rules and of the various philosophies of lawyering available to
guide lawyers in the exercise of that discretion has, I think, estab-
lished two propositions. First, given the wide range of discretion-
ary decisions that lawyers face, they need a philosophy of
lawyering to assist them in making such decisions. Second, none
of the available philosophies of lawyering has commanded (or
appears likely to command) sufficient support within the aca-
demic community or the profession as a whole to be accepted
institutionally. While critics of neutral partisanship have argued
that this philosophy represents the prevailing ethic of the profes-
sion, if these critics are correct, it is because neutral partisanship
is de facto rather than de jure the prevailing philosophy.95 The
Model Rules themselves certainly do not support the proposition
92. SIMON, supra note 6, at 140. See also Simon, supra note 86, at 1098.
93. See Symposium, 51 STAN. L. REV. 867 (1999).
94. Compare Monroe H. Freedman, Must You be the Devil's Advocate, LEGAL
TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at 19, with Michael E. Tigar, Setting the Record Straight on the
Defense of John Demjanjuk, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993, at 22, and Monroe H.
Freedman, The Morality of Lawyering, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993, at 22.
95. Professor Fred Zacharias agrees that the Code and the Model Rules
authorize lawyers to incorporate moral factors in their representation of clients,
but he argues that the ethos of the practice has developed to limit the exercise
of objective judgment. He proposes a number of institutional changes that can
help reintroduce objectivity into the lawyer's role. See Fred C. Zacharias, Recon-
ciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY" L. REv. 1303 (1995).
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that lawyers should act as neutral partisans. The preamble to the
Model Rules states:
Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from con-
flict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the
legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining
an upright person while earning a satisfactory living. The
Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe terms for resolv-
ing such conflicts. Within the framework of these Rules,
many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise.
Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensi-
tive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic
principles underlying the Rules.
9 6
As discussed in Part I, numerous rules of professional conduct
are inconsistent with the concept of the lawyer as only a neutral
partisan.97
The combination of lawyers' need for a philosophy of lawy-
ering and the lack of institutional direction produces undesir-
able consequences. Because the profession is unable to develop
a consensus on an appropriate philosophy of lawyering, lawyers
are left to their own devices in developing their philosophies. A
few lawyers may do so thoughtfully, but most will simply muddle
through, developing an ad hoc philosophy of lawyering. Given
the present structure of the profession, however, an ad hoc phi-
losophy of lawyering will often become de facto a philosophy of
neutral partisanship.9" The economics of the profession favor
neutral partisanship. Clients pay lawyers' fees, and lawyers are
not compensated for protecting or even taking into account
other interests. Moreover, psychologically, a number of factors
point lawyers in the direction of neutral partisanship.99
In addition to the adverse impact on lawyers, the absence of
philosophical direction is harmful to clients. Approaches to lawy-
ering vary widely depending on factors such as practice setting
96. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble para. 8 (1997).
97. See id. Rule 1.2(a) (scope of representation); id. Rule 1.16(b) (stan-
dards for permissive withdrawal); id. Rule 2.1 (advisor); id. Rule 4.4 (respect for
rights of third persons); id. Rule 6.1 (voluntary pro bono service); id. Rule 6.2
(accepting appointments); id. Rule 6.4 (law reform activities affecting client
interests).
98. See Zacharias, supra note 95.
99. See Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers
Change? A Critique of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to Empiri-
cally-Derived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 547 (1998).
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and client sophistication.100 By word of mouth, some clients may
gain a sense of the general approach of lawyers they hire. A few
lawyers may take the trouble to explain to their clients their gen-
eral approach or philosophy of representation. Clients, however,
are entitled to more than word of mouth or the luck of the draw.
Clients are entitled to receive from their lawyers a clear expres-
sion of the lawyer's philosophy of representation.
The professionalism movement represents, in my view, an
effort by the organized bar to respond to lawyers' need for gui-
dance in the exercise of discretion. The movement suffers, how-
ever, from two fundamental flaws: vagueness of the meaning of
professionalism and lack of enforcement. What the bar means
by professionalism is uncertain. For example, the Action Plan of
the Conference of Chief Justices states:
Professionalism is a much broader concept than legal
ethics. For the purposes of this report, professionalism
includes not only civility among members of the bench and
bar, but also competence, integrity, respect for the rule of
law, participation in pro bono and community service, and
conduct by members of the legal profession that exceeds
the minimum ethical requirements. Ethical rules are what
a lawyer must obey. Principles of professionalism are what
a lawyer should live by in conducting his or her affairs.
Unlike disciplinary rules that can be implemented and
enforced, professionalism is a personal characteristic.
101
To the extent the bar attempts to make professionalism stan-
dards more specific, however, it creates another problem: favorit-
ism of one approach to lawyering over others.10 2 In addition,
advocates of professionalism have declined to create a mecha-
nism for enforcement of professionalism standards-but if no
enforcement mechanism exists, how do we expect lawyers to take
professionalism seriously?
B. A Proposal
In this section, I offer a proposal to deal with the problem I
have identified in the previous section. The proposal has four
100. See Ann Southworth, Lawyer-Client Decisionmaking in Civil Rights and
Poverty Practice: An Empirical Study of Lawyers'Norms, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1101
(1996).
101. See National Action Plan, supra note 62, at 2. See also MICAELJ. KELLY,
LivEs OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF PRACTICE 5-7 (1994) (list-
ing eleven variations on the meaning of professionalism).
102. See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Cru-
sade, 74 TEX. L. REv. 259 (1995).
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components: (1) bar application statement of a philosophy of
lawyering; (2) annual certification and revision of a lawyer's phi-
losophy of lawyering; (3) required notification to clients of a law-
yer's philosophy of lawyering; (4) disciplinary actions against
lawyers for flagrant violation of the terms of their philosophy of
lawyering.
1. Bar Application Statement of a Philosophy of Lawyering
All applicants for admission to the bar will be required as
part of their bar application to file a statement of their philoso-
phy of lawyering. The instructions will state that there is no one
correct philosophy of lawyering. Applicants may adopt a philoso-
phy articulated by someone else or may craft their own philoso-
phies. Applicants may choose to have different philosophies
depending on the type of practice or the sophistication of the
client, or they may decide to have a unitary philosophy that
applies regardless of the type of practice. 10 3 The three essential
components of such a statement are an articulation of general
principles that form the basis of the philosophy of lawyering, a
statement of justification for those principles, and the applica-
tion of those principles to several major discretionary decisions
that lawyers are likely to face in the practice of law.
How should bar admission officials treat these statements?
There are several possibilities. One is that bar officials will do
nothing with the statements; as discussed below, other regulatory
mechanisms exist. If resources are sufficient, bar officials could
do a limited screening of the statements to identify statements
that are not seriously prepared or express a philosophy of lawyer-
ing not within the range of professional discretion. Statements
that are not seriously prepared could be returned to applicants
for resubmission. Some statements might express a philosophy
of lawyering beyond the realm of reasonable professional discre-
tion. In such cases, the committee could call the applicant in for
an interview to discuss the applicant's philosophy. For reasons
developed more fully below, the committee would not, however,
have the power to reject an applicant based on the applicant's
philosophy of lawyering, although applicants could be warned
that adherence to such a philosophy could lead to disciplinary
action in the future. For example, suppose an applicant stated
that his philosophy of lawyering was founded on opposition to
the federal income tax and that he would devote his practice to
developing legal challenges to the constitutionality and enforce-
ment of the federal income tax laws. The committee might warn
103. See SIMON, supra note 6, at ch. 7.
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the applicant that some challenges are likely to be found to be
unethical either because they are fraudulent or involve frivolous
claims.
I offer the following as a discussion draft of the instructions
for such a statement.
Write a statement of your philosophy of lawyering not
to exceed ten double-spaced pages. In preparing your
statement you may draw and quote from philosophies of
lawyering articulated by lawyers and scholars, but you are
not bound to follow any particular philosophy of lawyer-
ing. There is no single correct philosophy of lawyering
and within a very broad range you are free to adopt a phi-
losophy of lawyering that you consider to be sound. The
Committee on Character and Fitness will not reject your
application because it or any of its members disagree with
your philosophy of lawyering. The Committee reserves the
right in extreme cases to call an applicant in for an inter-
view if the Committee concludes that the statement reflects
a philosophy of lawyering outside the range of professional
discretion, the implementation of which would be likely to
lead to disciplinary action against the applicant after
admission to the bar.
Your statement must include the following: (1) a state-
ment of the basic principles that are the foundation of
your philosophy of lawyering; (2) justification for your use
of these principles; and (3) explanation of how you would
apply your principles to the following types of problems
that you may face in practice:
(a) Choice of type of practice;
(b) Decision to take or decline cases;
(c) Scope of counseling a client regarding exercise of
the client's legal rights;
(d) Exercise of professional discretion on behalf of a
client (e.g. deciding whether to cross-examine a
witness);
(e) Withdrawal from representation because the law-
yer concludes that the client is acting immorally;
(f) Preventing the client from doing harm to others
(e.g. disclosing the client's intention to commit a
wrongful act);
(g) Acting on behalf of a client in ways that will harm
others;
(h) Participation in pro bono, law reform, and other
professional activities to improve the law.
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To guide applicants, the bar application could give several exam-
ples of different philosophies of lawyering.
2. Annual Certification and Revision of a Lawyer's Philosophy
of Lawyering
Each year when lawyers pay their annual bar dues, they will
be required to certify their continued commitment to their phi-
losophy of lawyering or to make such revisions in their statement
as they consider appropriate. The annual review and certifica-
tion serves two purposes: First, it operates as a mechanism to
remind lawyers of their continuing commitment to a philosophy
of lawyering. Second, it gives lawyers an opportunity to revise
their statements to take into account their experiences and
changes in their thinking about what it means to be a lawyer.
Should lawyers be allowed to revise their statements whenever
they wish, rather than only annually? While a philosophy of lawy-
ering must be dynamic, if a philosophy can be revised at any
time, it ceases to become a set of principles and instead becomes
an ad hoc accommodation to the current set of pressures that
the lawyer may be facing. A right to revise annually seems to be a
reasonable compromise between the need for change and com-
mitment to principle.
3. Required Notification to Clients of a Lawyer's Philosophy
of Lawyering
Lawyers should be required to notify their clients in some
appropriate fashion of their philosophy of lawyering. Notifica-
tion can be accomplished in many ways. Lawyers can give new
clients a copy of their philosophy of lawyering as part of a
brochure describing the lawyer and his practice when the client
first contacts the lawyer. Lawyers can post their philosophies of
lawyering on their web pages. A summary of the lawyer's philoso-
phy can be included or referred to in the lawyer's engagement
agreement with a reference to the source of a more complete
statement of the lawyer's philosophy.
To implement this requirement of client notification, a new
section (f) should be added to Model Rule 1.2. The following is
a draft of a proposed section:
A lawyer shall provide a client with a statement of the
lawyer's philosophy of lawyering prior the lawyer's
engagement.
Appropriate commentary should be added to explain the scope
of the statement and to offer examples of ways in which the state-
ment could be supplied to clients.
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4. Disciplinary Actions against Lawyers for Flagrant Violation
of the Terms of their Philosophy of Lawyering
Lawyers' statements of their philosophy of lawyering consti-
tute representations by them of the principles that they will use
to deal with difficult issues of professional responsibility. A law-
yer who flagrantly fails to honor these principles could be found
guilty of misconduct under Model Rule 8.4 by engaging in con-
duct involving deceit or misrepresentation.
In summary, the proposal I have made in this part is
designed to require lawyers to develop a philosophy of lawyering,
to inform clients of their philosophy, and to create an institu-
tional structure for enforcement of lawyers' philosophies, while
recognizing that a variety of legitimate philosophies of lawyering
can exist.
C. Some Criticisms and Responses
I expect substantial criticism of my proposal. In this section
I offer my responses to some of the criticisms that I anticipate
being made. First, one might argue that this proposal amounts
to touchy-feely nonsense. The practice of law is a tough competi-
tive business and only an academic who doesn't know anything
about the practice of law would come up with an idea like this.
However, the core of this criticism is a philosophy of lawyering
grounded largely in neutral partisanship. If this is what the law-
yer believes, the lawyer should be willing to stand behind it by
articulating and defending this philosophy of lawyering.
Next, some may argue that if lawyers truly need a philosophy
of lawyering, they can develop one on their own without being
required to do so by the bar. This position is in essence an argu-
ment for the status quo. Any lawyer who believes that the current
state of the profession is sound should reject my proposal. The
existence of the professionalism movement and substantial schol-
arly work on the malaise within the profession1"4 indicate, how-
ever, that the profession is suffering from some fundamental
problems.
Even if one accepts that the profession is suffering from fun-
damental problems, it does not follow that my proposal is the
best or even an effective way to deal with those problems. It
seems to me, however, that any proposal must focus on both the
104. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS
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need for lawyers to have a broader philosophical approach to
lawyering while at the same time admitting that a wide diversity
of lawyering styles exist and can be justified. My proposal
responds to both of these factors. In addition, my proposal does
not require the creation of any new regulatory bureaucracy, nor
does it operate substantively. The core Qf my proposal is disclo-
sure regulation, allowing clients to scrutinize lawyers' philoso-
phies of lawyering.
Next, it might be claimed that given the factors that tend to
favor neutral partisanship, acceptance of this proposal will tend
to exacerbate the bias in favor of neutral partisanship. The
thrust of this argument is that the only way that philosophies
other than neutral partisanship can develop is under-the-table.
Lawyers can be concerned about the morality of lawyering or
substantive justice, but only if they do so surreptitiously.
I think this argument is factually incorrect and morally rep-
rehensible. The leaders of the bar and the lawyers who are most
admired in the profession are not exemplars of neutral partisan-
ship. These lawyers bring good judgment and a strong sense of
values to their representation of private clients. Moreover, these
lawyers typically exhibit a strong commitment to professional and
social issues.1°5 There is no reason to believe that young lawyers
when they develop their philosophies of lawyering will not turn
to the standards of lawyers who are widely admired. Moreover, it
is morally reprehensible to argue that alternatives to neutral par-
tisanship can only be developed by lawyers who don't have the
courage to state and justify their principles and only by deceiving
clients, judges, and other lawyers about the lawyer's values.
Next, one might claim that lawyers won't treat the require-
ment seriously. Prepared statements will proliferate on places
like the internet and lazy lawyers will simply adopt such state-
ments without much thought. I question the accuracy of this
criticism. I think that lawyers will take seriously statements that
they must file with bar admission officials, make available to their
clients, and face potential discipline for violating.
I do anticipate that recommended statements of general
philosophies of lawyering or of particular aspects of the lawyer's
role will develop. Indeed, a number of professional organiza-
tions have already developed such standards. 10 6 I welcome such
105. See, e.g., ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE
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models. If a lawyer wishes to adopt a philosophy prepared by
such an organization because it represents a philosophy that the
lawyer considers sound, a lawyer should be free to do so.
Finally, one might argue that putting power in the hands of
admission or disciplinary authorities is dangerous and has the
potential for free speech abuse. In a comprehensive study of the
history and implementation of the moral character requirement
for bar admission, Professor Deborah Rhode questions the wis-
dom of having this condition for bar admission. Among the criti-
cisms she makes are the following: First, bar admission officials
do not have the resources for adequate investigation into moral
character, and the inquiries they do conduct are only minimally
helpful in determining the moral character of applicants. Sec-
ond, because of the vagueness of the moral character concept,
the admission process is left to the subjective judgment of bar
officials. Her study indicates a lack of consensus among these
officials as to the types of conduct that warrant investigation or
denial of admission. Third, review of character has First Amend-
ment implications, inhibiting freedom of expression by some
individuals and deterring others from applying for bar admis-
sion. Wide ranging inquiry into the activities of bar applicants
also raises privacy issues. Professor Rhode concludes that the bar
would be better off abandoning the moral character requirement
for bar admission and instead using its limited resources in disci-
plining lawyers for actual misconduct.'1
7
Since my proposal calls for a new bar admission requirement
akin to moral character, I take Professor Rhode's criticisms seri-
ously. I recognize that creating a new bar admission requirement
poses the risk of abuse by bar officials and creates free speech
concerns. I propose to deal with these concerns by strictly limit-
ing the power of character and fitness officials over such state-
ments. Officials would not be allowed to reject applicants
because of their philosophical statements. Officials would have
the power to return statements to applicants if the statements
were incomplete or showed evidence that they were not seriously
prepared. The committee could call applicants in for interviews
to discuss their statements if the committee believed that the
statement reflected a philosophy of lawyering that in the opinion
of the committee was beyond the realm of professional discre-
tion. A committee could give an informal warning to an appli-
107. See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential 94
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cant that adherence to such a philosophy could lead to
disciplinary action in the future.
It is not crucial to my proposal that statements of philoso-
phies of lawyering be filed with bar admission officials. Disclo-
sure could simply be made to clients rather than to the bar.
Despite the risks associated with making statements part of the
bar admission process, I think this aspect of the proposal is
important for several reasons. First, it sends a message, to lawyers
that the bar considers statements of philosophies of lawyering to
be important. Second, it makes the development of a philosophy
part of the professional process rather than simply a matter of
the relationship between lawyer and client. This step signifies
that applicants have both professional as well as client obliga-
tions. Finally, while I recognize the risks of bar scrutiny of these
statements, I think the bar should have the opportunity to discuss
with an applicant what it means to be a lawyer when a statement
reflects views that may be seriously misguided.
CONCLUSION
The organized bar has been searching for some time for a
way to deal with what it considers to be a serious erosion of pro-
fessionalism. At the same time individual lawyers are in need of
guidance on how to deal with the wide range of discretionary
decisions they face in the practice of law. The proposal I offer
attempts to respond to both of these concerns without at the
same time directing lawyers to practice in only one way.
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